### T Shell

#### Interp and violation Procurement is distinct from financial incentives

Newell 7 February 2007 Climate Technology Policy Richard G. Newell <http://unfccc.int/ttclear/pdf/EGTT/AWGLCA/Technology%20under%20BAP/Climate%20Technology%20Policy.pdf>, mmm/uco

Deployment policies can be categorized into six main types: mandates, financial

incentives, government procurement, infrastructure permitting, information provision, and

international technology transfer. While technology deployment mandates and incentives can

typically be targeted to achieve the same ends (e.g., renewable fuel standard and ethanolproduction tax credit), procurement and technology transfer serve somewhat different purposes.

One way in which mandates tend to differ from the other policies is that they place the associated

costs on producers and consumers in the regulated sector, as opposed to placing those costs on

taxpayers. This difference across policies can in some cases be altered, however, though “selffinancing” mechanisms. One such example is a “feebate” for automobile fuel economy, where

subsidies for efficient vehicles are paid for by fees on inefficient vehicles. Another example is a

surcharge on electricity used to pay for deployment of energy-efficient and renewable

technologies.

#### Reasons to prefer and to vote neg

1. Limits- adding procurement to the topic infinitely expands the number of affs available- each technology can be procured by different agencies and deployed in manners to spike out of neg links.
2. Ground- procurement allows the aff to fiat away key link, solvency, and counterplan ground based on the effectiveness of incentives. It creates an unfair playing field for the neg where the aff gets to magically implement their technology.

####  Topicality should be viewed through competing interpretations, its most educational

#### The AFF’s approach to reduction of the natural world to a means of securing energy enframes existence, stripping beings of their very essence.

Beckman 0

[Tad, Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” [http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html //](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html%20//) myost]

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. [(7)](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_7_) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

#### The AFF is part and parcel of a larger narrative of US exceptionalism—their assertion that the international arena can be rationally known and ordered springs from an epistemology which treats beings as objects—setting the stage for endless imperial violence

Spanos 3

[William V., Distinguished Professor of English at SUNY–Binghamton, “A Rumor of War: 9/11 and the Forgetting of the Vietnam War,” *boundary 2* 30.3 (2003): 29-66. // myost]

The other difference, indissolubly associated with the first, is that, despite its infinitely more powerful military might, the United States lost the war to the recalcitrant Other it would subdue and accommodate. And it lost it because in this globalized postcolonial context—that is, by way of the disclosures released by the self-destruction of the end-oriented philosophical, epistemological, and cultural mechanisms of Western imperialism—America's Other, as Caputo testifies synecdochically, refused to be answerable to the American exceptionalist narrative. Its response rather was to be rhizomatically mobile, strategically indeterminate in its goals, erratic in its actions, indifferent to temporal and spatial boundaries, resistant (in its attunement to the slow motion of being) to the dictates of technological speed, and, not least, invisible to America's Ahabian gaze, all calculated to decompose the relay of American power extending back from its forward-oriented military machine, through its progressivist capitalist cultural apparatuses, to the instrumentalist (Franklinian "can-do") thinking that was planning and conducting the war from the Pentagon. This double difference, despite his effort to personalize and then assimilate this war to war in general is, as I have tried to show, the symptomatic testimony of Caputo's representative memoir A Rumor of War. And it is the specter of this witness to the visible contradiction between America's ontological justification of the Vietnam War and its Ahabian practice that has haunted American foreign policy since the fall of Saigon in 1975 and explains the dominant culture's obsessive will to forget Vietnam since then—an amnesiac process apparently culminating in the Gulf War and a triumphant "end-of-history" discourse—and its studied avoidance of reference to the Vietnam War in its effort to justify to the American people and the world at large its ferocious retaliatory attack on Afghanistan. [End Page 62] This double difference, I submit, is also why it is imperative that intellectuals who oppose the United States' representation and conduct of the "war against terrorism" retrieve the forgotten memory of the Vietnam War as Caputo's deeply backgrounded, representative text articulates it. For, as I hope I have shown, it is not simply its spectral witness to the terror of America's exceptionalist "search-and-destroy" mentality that, despite the sustained attempt to obliterate it from its history, continues to haunt the present American government's—and the American media's—concentering personification of the complex global conditions, which America itself has largely produced, in the name of its exceptionalist mission in the world's wilderness, in the demonized symbolic figure of Osama bin Laden, its most recent Moby Dick. It is also the Vietnam War's spectral witness to a mighty America's humiliating defeat at the hands of an Other—its Other—which refused to accommodate itself to America's exceptionalist story in Southeast Asia that now haunts America's metaphysical, epistemological, cultural, military, and political project against a decidedly undecidable "enemy" in the Middle East, a diverse and amorphous area of the world that has for centuries suffered the terrible human consequences of being the second, essentialized, term in the Occident's binary logic, and thus is as likely as Vietnam to turn the United States' power against itself. To put all this another way, the United States will no doubt succeed in its military mission to defeat the Taliban and (less certainly) to re-create an Afghanistan nation-state in its own image (as it did—several times—in Vietnam in the early years of the war). It may even capture and bring Osama bin Laden to trial (even, against the judicial tradition of democracy, to be tried by a military court). But granted this successful "accomplishment," it is no more likely to annul or even assuage the outrage that the United States has increasingly ignited in the Islamic world at large by its concentering of the cultural, social, and political global morass its exceptionalist ethos has produced and is producing than Captain Ahab's "monomania"—his concentering reduction of the ineffable being of being ("All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lee of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks and sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought") to Moby Dick—was able to annul the self-defensive outrage of the white whale. Perhaps what I am suggesting by way of invoking the witness of the Vietnam War about the ultimate consequences of America's response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon will become unequivocally manifest by reconstellating both these moments of American history [End Page 63] into the "hidden history of the Revolutionary Atlantic" (the period extending from the origins of the Atlantic slave trade to the Revolutionary years) retrieved by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker from the oblivion to which it has been relegated by the "Herculean" monumentalist historians of this "glorious" earlier epochal moment of the march of Western civilization: The classically educated architects of the Atlantic economy found in Hercules . . . a symbol of power and order. For inspiration they looked to the Greeks, for whom Hercules was a unifier of the centralized territorial state, and to the Romans, for whom he signified vast imperial ambition. The labors of Hercules symbolized economic development: clearing of land, the draining of swamps, and the development of agriculture, as well as the domestication of livestock, the establishment of commerce, and the introduction of technology. The rulers placed the image of Hercules on money and seals, in pictures, sculptures, and palaces, and on arches of triumph. . . . John Adams, for his part, proposed in 1776 that "The Judgment of Hercules" be the seal for the new United States of America. . . . These same rulers found in the many-headed hydra an antithetical symbol of disorder and resistance, a powerful threat to the building of state, empire, and capitalism. The second labor of Hercules was the destruction of the venomous hydra of Lerna. . . . From the beginning of English colonial expansion in the early seventeenth century through the metropolitan industrialization of the early nineteenth, rulers referred to the Hercules-hydra myth to describe the difficulty of imposing order on increasingly global systems of labor. They variously designated dispossessed commoners, transported felons, indentured servants, religious radicals, pirates, urban laborers, soldiers, sailors, and African slaves as the numerous ever-changing heads of the monster. But the heads, though originally brought into productive combination by their Herculean rulers, soon developed among themselves new forms of cooperation against those rulers, from mutinies and strikes to riots and insurrections and revolution. 24 As Caputo and virtually every American soldier who fought in Vietnam reiteratively testify, the insurgents of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, [End Page 64] like the many-headed hydra of European antiquity (and of the Revolutionary Atlantic economy), were constantly defeated by the "Herculean" American military juggernaut, but they nevertheless kept rising up in unpredictable places and times to eventually bring their would-be monster-slayer to a dead end. Given the incommensurability of America's predictable invocation of the (mythical) logic of exceptionalism and the postcolonial condition, there is little reason to believe that the hatred precipitated by the United States' perennial unilateral "defense" of its "interests" in the Islamic world—a defense expedited by its reduction of the diversity of this world to an abstract and predictable stereotype—will not also manifest itself as a "many-headed hydra" that will resurface in unexpected places at unexpected times to constantly molecularize, and neutralize the power of, the concentering Ahabian American narrative, its self-present will, and its forwarding military machine. The lesson the Vietnam War should have taught America, but apparently has not, is that in this globalized postcolonial age, only a rethinking of America's perennial exceptionalist mission in the world's "wilderness"—a rethinking that must be genealogical, that must, in other words, understand America's modern (instrumentalist) foreign policy in the light of the very formation of the American national identity—will resolve the complex global conditions that are the dark legacy of Western imperialism. Only such a radical genealogical rethinking of America's role in the world will be able to negate the present historical context, which promises not the Pax Americana but, as even the Bush administration acknowledges when its deputies remind the American public that the war against terror does not have a foreseeable end, an ongoing, undecidable war against an undecidable enemy—not to say the establishment of a perpetual national state of emergency that will play havoc on the civil rights of the American people.

#### The AFF’s representations of nuclear war as catastrophe render invisible the ongoing violence against the Fourth World. This de-historicization of nuclear conflict authorizes limitless violence and genocide.

Kato 93

[Masahide, Professor in Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu; “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,” Alternatives, Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 1993, pg. 347-349, ISSN 0304-3754. // Ether]

The vigorous invasion of the logic of capitalist accumulation into the last vestige of relatively autonomous space in the periphery under late capitalism is propelled not only by the desire for incorporating every fabric of the society into the division of labor but also by the desire for "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery." The penetration of capital into the social fabric and the destruction of nature and preexisting social organizations by capital are not separable. However, what we have witnessed in the phase of late capitalism is a rapid intensification of the destruction and extermination of the periphery. In this context, capital is no longer interested in incorporating some parts of the periphery into the international division of labor. The emergence of such "pure" destruction/extermination of the periphery can be explained, at least partially, by another problematic of late capitalism formulated by Ernest Mandel: the mass production of the means of destruction." Particularly, the latest phase of capitalism distinguishes itself from the earlier phases in its production of the "ultimate" means of destruction/extermination, i.e., nuclear weapons. Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth." The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times)." The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . . were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkablde study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

#### The AFF prescribes an otherizing discourse that serves to re-legitimate our position of power—this seeks to affirm our rationality while assuming the non-western world is driven by irrational impulses.

Gusterson 99

[Hugh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology 14.1 (Feb 1999): 111-143.] // myost

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

#### This enframing of the political makes conflict and war inevitable

Burke 7 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW-Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” *Theory & Event* 8.2 (2007): Project Muse // myost]

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

#### Vote NEG to think resistance as a specter of Western politics – this over-determination of the ontological challenges the hegemony of pragmatism which the AFF champions, refusing intervention

Spanos 8

[William V., Distinguished Professor of English at SUNY–Binghamton, *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam*, p. 27-30 // myost]

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger's Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene-the "ghostly" ontological exile evolving a way of "errant" thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic-with, say, Said's political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigre evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the "Truth" of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The "political Left" of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum "against theory," was entirely justified in accusing the "theoretical" discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said's word, "unworldly"-indifferent to the "imperial" politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global "triumph" of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America's arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, "destabilizing" cultures, that this Left's focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxis-oriented discourse, that is, tends-even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced "white" metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes-to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary-and disabling disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper. 35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related "sites" from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of "differences" released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture's disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean "the nothing" (das Nichts) or "the ontological difference" (Heidegger), "existence" (Sartre), "the absolutely other" (Levinas), "the differance" or " trace" (Derrida), "the differend" (Lyotard), the "invisible" or "absent cause" (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt "white"/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean "the pariah" (Arendt), "the nomad" (Deleuze and Guattari), "the hybrid" or "the minus in the origin" (Bhabha), "the nonbeings" (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), "the emigre" (Said), "the denizen" (Hammar), "the refugee" (Agamben), "the queer" (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), "the multitude" (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post"colonial" thinkers with a certain strain of post"modern" black American literature, "the darkness" (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt "white"/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness-a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation's literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral "nothing" that a triumphant empirical science ''wishes to know nothing" about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West's perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice-the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing-and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenrnent Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this "triumphant" post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part oncological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the "ontotheological tradition." It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by rhe late or post-Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative diclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

### 1NC Frontline

#### a) The end of American dominance is inevitable and already underway

Layne 12 [Christopher, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (2012): 203-213.] // myost

There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 was the United States’ first unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order—the Pax Americana— which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal (‘‘soft power’’) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the ‘‘hard’’ power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering.

#### b) The only question of this transition is whether it will be violent or peaceful – clinging to hegemony ensures bloody conflicts

Quinn 11 (Adam, Department of Political Science and International Studies School of Government and Society Muirhead Tower University of Birmingham, “The art of declining politely: Obama's prudent presidency and the waning of American power,” *International Affairs* 87.4 (July 2011): 803-824)CD)

As noted in the opening passages of this article, the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. Facing this incipient period of decline, America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’, refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. President Obama’s approach, defined by restraint and awareness of limits, makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that, to cite one example, his predecessor was not. He is, in short, a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline.97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline, then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment, trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. As part of such a project, it can, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power, preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa.

### Solvency

#### Government procurement leads to corruption and collusion

OECD 10 Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement 2010 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/cartelsandanti-competitiveagreements/46235399.pdf>, mmm/uco

Collusion and corruption are distinct problems within public procurement, yet they may frequently occur in tandem, and have mutually reinforcing effect. They are best viewed, therefore, as concomitant threats to the integrity of public procurement. The distinctiveness of public procurement and its context makes the process particularly vulnerable to collusion and corruption, while also increasing the magnitude of harm that these offences cause. Tackling collusion and corruption are not mutually exclusive goals, so there is a need to accommodate both in order to better protect the public procurement process.

**SMR fail for military use- 3 reasons**

**Parthermore 10** (Christine, writer for the Center for New American Security, “Parthemore & Rogers: Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky”, ([http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)CD](http://www.cnas.org/node/4502%29CD))

On the other hand, **opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary.** In most cases, **additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities.**

**Several reasons mean SMR can’t solve for the DoD**

**Carmen et al 10** (United States Naval Commander Herbert E, Christina Parthemore, Will Rogers, “Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces”, (http://www.cnas.org/node/4374)CD)

 Many serious complications must be weighed as well. **Military base personnel often do not have the necessary training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials. Nuclear reactors would necessitate additional qualified personnel and improved physical security requirements to meet the 24/7 operations needs. As with siting** for all energy production, **local public resistance could be problematic. When considering the impact of a reactor casualty, the resulting impact on the operational mission effectiveness of the tenant commands on the base must also be considered so as to avoid a single point vulnerability that disables all military operations on site**. And while many private companies are touting new designs for small reactors that would work well in this capacity, **the technology may still be years away from fully meeting technical requirements and federal regulatory standards.13 Proliferation considerations would also need to be part of any adjudication of what types of reactors are most suitable for these purposes**

**No solvency- manufacturing delays mean that SMR’s can’t even get built**

**Department of commerce 11** (U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, ([http://www.trade.gov/publications/pdfs/the-commercial-outlook-for-us-small-modular-nuclear-reactors.pdf)CD](http://www.trade.gov/publications/pdfs/the-commercial-outlook-for-us-small-modular-nuclear-reactors.pdf%29CD))

**One obstacle is diminished manufacturing capac­ity. U.S. nuclear competitiveness is hampered because U.S. manufacturing capacity has been eroded through the lack of new reactor construc­tion** during the past few decades. Some **govern­ment resources to help manufacturers are not appropriate for nuclear suppliers**, or the resources exclude the suppliers entirely. For example, **only two U.S. nuclear manufacturers qualified for the advanced energy manufacturing tax credit**. The timeline to be eligible for the credit requires a facil­ity to be up and running four years from certifica­tion. **Some U.S. firms say that the timeline is too short for many nuclear suppliers; just acquiring the high-precision machines necessary to retool and rebuild capacity can require a lead time of several years.**

#### Small reactors are expensive

Makhijani and Boyd 10 (September, ARJUN MAKHIJANI, electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research AND MICHELE BOYD, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility, Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power, www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/.../small-modular-reactors-no.pdf,)

SMR proponents claim that small size will en- able mass manufacture in a factory, enabling considerable savings relative to field construc- tion and assembly that is typical of large reac- tors. In other words, modular reactors will be cheaper because they will be more like as- sembly line cars than hand-made Lamborghi- nis. In the case of reactors, however, several offsetting factors will tend to neutralize this advantage and make the costs per kilowatt of small reactors higher than large reactors. First, in contrast to cars or smart phones or similar widgets, the materials cost per kilowatt of a reactor goes up as the size goes down. This is because the surface area per kilowatt of capacity, which dominates materi- als cost, goes up as reactor size is decreased. Similarly, the cost per kilowatt of secondary containment, as well as independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management, increases as size decreases. Cost per kilowatt also increases if each reac- tor has dedicated and independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management. For these reasons, the nuclear industry has been building larger and larger reactors in an effort to try to achieve economies of scale and make nuclear power economically competitive. Proponents argue that because these nuclear projects would consist of several smaller reactor modules instead of one large reactor, the construction time will be shorter and therefore costs will be reduced. How- ever, this argument fails to take into account the implications of installing many reactor modules in a phased manner at one site, which is the proposed approach at least for the United States. In this case, a large contain- ment structure with a single control room would be built at the beginning of the project that could accommodate all the planned capacity at the site. The result would be that the first few units would be saddled with very high costs, while the later units would be less expensive. The realization of economies of scale would depend on the construction period of the entire project, possibly over an even longer time span than present large- reactor projects. If the later-planned units are not built, for instance due to slower growth than anticipated, the earlier units would likely be more expensive than present reactors, just from the diseconomies of the containment, site preparation, instrumentation and control system expenditures. Alternatively, a contain- ment structure and instrumentation and control could be built for each reactor. This would greatly increase unit costs and per kilo- watt capital costs. Some designs (such as the PBMR) propose no secondary containment, but this would increase safety risks. These cost increases are unlikely to be offset even if the entire reactor is manufac- tured at a central facility and some economies are achieved by mass manufacturing com- pared to large reactors assembled on site. Furthermore, estimates of low prices must be regarded with skepticism due to the history of past cost escalations for nuclear reactors and the potential for cost increases due to require- ments arising in the process of NRC certifica- tion. Some SMR designers are proposing that no prototype be built and that the necessary licensing tests be simulated. Whatever the process, it will have to be rigorous to ensure safety, especially given the history of some of proposed designs.